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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE 1966 OBSCENITY CASES
That obscenity is not within the ambit of constitutionally
protected free speech and press was decided by the United States
Supreme Court in Roth v. United States.) American courts re-
jected the early English rule that material was to be judged by
the effect of isolated passages on particularly susceptible per-
sons, 2 and Roth merely reiterated what lower courts had been
saying for years,3 that the test for obscenity is "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest.' 4 This standard provides little guidance in
predicting what materials may be declared obscene. 5 Realizing
it is essential to distinguish between actual obscenity and mate-
rials which merely delve into areas not traditionally within soci-
ety's norms of acceptability,6 members of the Court began to
consider the many practical problems left unsettled by Roth.
What is the "average person"? What are "contemporary com-
munity standards"? What is "prurient interest"? In groups of
twos and threes, the Justices sought to clarify the basic stand-
ard; the results have created substantial difficulty in determin-
ing the legal definition of obscenity. Justices Brennan, Harlan,
and Stewart are of the opinion that the contemporary commu-
nity standards to be applied must be national rather than local.7
Justice Brennan introduced the belief that a work may be de-
clared obscene only if "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance." Justice Harlan put forth the idea that material must
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2. The test was first applied in Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
It had been adopted in some of the early American cases. See United States
v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v. Clarke, 38 Fed.
500 (E.D. Mo. 1889); Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass. 346, 86 N.E. 910
(1909).
3. See, e.g., Walker v. Pompenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Parmelee
v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940); United States v. Levine, 83
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936) ; United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp.
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3
Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954); ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 6 1957).
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
5. See GERBER, SEX, PORNOoRAPiY, AND JUSTICE 129-31 (1965) ; Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity. SuP. CT. REV. 1, 15 (1960).
6. See Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
7. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964) (Brennan, J.) ; Manual En-
terprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (Harlan and Stewart, JJ.).
8. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) : "Nor may the constitutional
statuo of the material -be made to turn on a 'weighing' of its social importance
against its prurient appeal, for a work cannot be proscribed unless it is 'utterly'
without social importance."
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be "patently offensive" before it may be held obscene. 9 How-
ever, in no decision prior to 1966 had a majority of the Court
been able to join in clarifying or expanding the elements of the
Roth standard. As a consequence, the obscenity vel non of ques-
tionable material was far too frequently determined by ad hoc
value judgments rather than by application of an abstract stand-
ard.10 This Note examines the effect of three 1966 decisions."
The result in Mishkin v. State of New York 12 was to be ex-
pected. Appellant was convicted of violating a state statute pro-
hibiting publication or sale of obscene books. 13 The books in
question depicted deviant sexual practices, such as flagellation,
fetishism, and lesbianism.1 4 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed, holding the statute not unconstitutionally vague as
written and not invalid as applied, since the standard of ob-
scenity as applied by the state courts limited the statute's reach
to "hard-core" pornography. Most of the Court have long agreed
that "hard-core" pornography is not protected by the first
amendment, and that states are free to devise reasonable stand-
ards for obscenity, provided they do not transgress the bounds
set in Roth.
In Mishkin the appellant urged that an element of the Roth
9. Manuel Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962). The concept was
essentially a change of terminology. "These magazines cannot be deemed so offen-
sive on their face as to affront current community standards of decency-a
quality that we shall hereafter refer to as 'patent offensiveness.' "
10. For a more detailed history of the obscenity standards and the laws regu-
lating obscenity, see GERBER, SEX, PORNOGRAPHY, AND JUSTICE (1965); Alpert,
Juridical Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1937) Gerber,
A Suggested Solution for the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 834
(1964) Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, SuP. CT. REV. 1
(1960) Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Con-
stitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960).
11. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) ; Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
12. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
13. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141 reads in pertinent part: "1. A person who
. . . has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute . . . any obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, sadistic, masochistic, or disgusting book . . . or
who . . . prints, utters, publishes, or in any manner manufactures, or prepares
any such book ...or who
"2. In any manner, hires, employs, uses or permits any person to do or
assist in doing any act or thing mentioned in this section, or any of them,
"Is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
"4. The possession by any person of six or more identical or similar articles
coming within the provisions of subdivision one of this section is presumptive
evidence of a violation of this section."
14. The information charged 159 counts of violating § 1141. Representative
titles are: THE WHIPPING CHORUS GIRLS, CULT OF THE SPANKERS, So FIRM
So FULLY PACKED, SORORITY GIRLS STRINGENT INITIATION, and STUD BROAD.
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test was lacking because the books in question depicted such
deviant sexual practices that they would hardly appeal to the
prurient interest of the "average person." The Court rejected
this argument, holding that when material is designed for a
specifically defined deviant group the prurient-appeal element
of the standard is satisfied if the material appeals to that group's
prurient interest.
In Ginzburg v. United States,15 the Supreme Court af-
firmed a conviction for knowingly distributing obscene lit-
erature through the mail in violation of the federal obscenity
statute. 6 The materials mailed included the periodical "Eros"
and the book "The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promis-
cuity. ' 17 The majority held that even if material is not obscene
in the abstract, evidence of the publisher's exploitation of its
prurient appeal may justify finding the material obscene. The
Court expressed this in unequivocal terms: "[W] here the pur-
veyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of
his publication, that fact may be decisive in the determination
of obscenity.""' In so holding, the Court has applied an unex-
pected mutation of the concept of "variable obscenity,"' 9 a theory
which allows obscene material to be considered non-obscene on
15. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), providing: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, filthy, or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance; and . . .
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertise-
ment, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or
how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters . . . may
be obtained . . . . Is hereby declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not
be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter
carrier."
17. ERos purported to be a magazine designed for sexual sophisticates, and
featured articles and photo essays dealing with various aspects of love and sex.
THE HOUSEWIFE'S HANDBOOK ON SELECTIVE PROMISCUITY depicted the sexual
and psychological misadventures of an "average American housewife."
18. 383 U.S. at 470. And later, id. at 475-76: "Where an exploitation of inter-
ests in titillation by pornography is shown with respect to material lending itself
to such exploitation through pervasive treatment or description of sexual mat-
ters, such evidence may support the determination that the material is obscene
even though in other contexts the material would escape such condemnation."
After unsuccessful attempts to have the material postmarked from Inter-
course and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania, mailing permits were obtained from Middle-
sex, New Jersey. A less subtle aspect of the advertising scheme was the un-
conditional money-back guarantee "if the book fails to reach you because of
U.S. Post Office censorship interference."
19. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 68 (1960) : "The issue, of course, is
whether obscenity is an inherent characteristic of obscene material, so that mate-
rial categorized as obscene is always obscene at all times and places and in all
circumstances, or whether it is a chameleonic quality of material that changes
with time, place, and circumstance."
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a showing that the material is innocently and constructively
employed. It appears the material here in controversy, judged
in the abstract by the Roth standard, was not obscene, but was
held obscene in light of the pandering element. Thus the Court
has added, by majority opinion, a new element to the Roth rule,
although they do not proclaim it as such. By virtue of Ginzburg,
"in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative with
respect to the nature of the material in question and thus satisfy
the Roth test." 2 "Close cases" apparently are ,those in which
the material is questionable.
The concept of variable obscenity had always been used to
treat obscene materials as if they were not obscene, and the
crucial variable was the reader, hearer, or viewer of the obscene
materials. For example, admittedly pornographic photographs
were not treated as obscene when used by the Institute for Sex
Research of Indiana University (the "Kinsey Institute") in sci-
entific studies.21 But this is in sharp contrast with the Court's
application of the theory in Ginzburg, where it employs the con-
cept to declare questionable materials obscene, the crucial vari-
able being the reprehensible intention of the publisher, exhibited
in advertising designed to appeal to the salaciously disposed.22
The argument that material obscene on its face should not be
proscribed if put to commendable uses seems far more rational
than that by which material not obscene in the abstract will
nevertheless become obscene if the publisher-distributor adver-
tises it as such. It is suggested that a logical application of
the theory of variable obscenity demands that materials sub-
ject to proscription be recognized as a species of obscene mate-
rials; thus, all material that is proscribed is necessarily obscene,
but not all obscene material is to be banned. When obscene ma-
terial is put to a legitimate, constructive use it does not thereby
.20. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 474 (1966).
21. United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
22. The opinion in Ginzburg is reminiscent of the words of Chief Justice
Warren in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (concurring opin-
ion) : "It is not the book that is on trial; it is the person. The conduct of the
defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture. The nature
of the material is, of course, relevant as an attribute of the defendant's conduct,
but the materials are thus placed -n context from which they draw color and
character. A wholly different result might be reached in a different setting."
It is submitted that when a defendant is charged with possessing or distributing
obscene materials, a determination of the nature of the materials is not only
relevant as an attribute of the defendant's conduct but is essential to support a
conviction. For if the material is not in fact obscene, the defendant did not
possess or distribute obscene materials, regardless of his intentions or motives.
In this regard, see the part of Justice Douglas' opinion which is pertinent to
this discussion, 383 U.S. 482-83 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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change its nature; it remains obscene but is no longer subject to
proscription. The Kinsey Institute, for example, knew well that
the photographs were obscene; had they not been obscene they
would not have served the Institute's purposes. It is submitted,
therefore, that the term "variable proscription" is more cogent
than "variable obscenity," and that although proper use may
render obscene material insusceptible of proscription, it does not
follow that blameworthy use should render non-obscene material
subject to proscription.
Although all may not agree with Mishkin and Ginzburg, the
manner in which they will be applied in the future seems quite
clear. Not so with the Fanny Hill case.23 The Massachusetts
courts declared the novel commonly called Fanny Hill obscene. 24
The United States Supreme Court reversed, but the six members
of the Court who voted for reversal were not united in their rea-
sons. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tice Fortas, based reversal on the belief that the lower courts
misapplied the social-value criterion of the federal definition
of obscenity by declaring the book obscene although it was found
to possess at least some element of social worth.
It has long been disputed whether the utter lack of social
value is a prerequisite for obscenity or merely the customary
incident of an obscene work. To escape the mandate of the
first amendment, the Court in Roth reasoned that the history
of the amendment indicates that all obscenity is "utterly with-
out redeeming social value.' 25 Given this, the Court was able
to justify the proscription of some materials, for the first amend-
ment was meant to protect only speech and press that has some
social worth, however slight.26 The argument in Fanny Hill is
that if no obscenity has redeeming social value, once a book is
found to have redeeming social value, it cannot be declared ob-
scene. Although the reasoning of Justices Brennan, Warren, and
Fortas is. structurally sound, it appears that they now choose to
overlook the impact of the word "redeeming" in both their ma-
jor and minor premises. The argument in Roth was not that
23. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The case is hereinafter
referred to in the text as the Fanny Hill case.
24. The book recounts the experiences of a young country girl who becomes
a London prostitute. It was written by John Cleland about 1750.
25. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
26. Id. at 484: "All ideas having the slightest social value must fall within
the protection offered by the First Amendment."
[Vol. XXVII
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obscenity is utterly without social value; it was that obscenity is
utterly without redeeming social value, indicating that the social
worth of the material should be balanced against its obscene
nature. "Indeed, obscenity was denoted in Roth as having 'such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived . . . is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality .... ' ",27 It seems that the plurality opinion
has now read out "redeeming" by stressing "utterly without.
2 8
Notwithstanding the lack of a majority rationale, it appears
that the social-value aspect will be an element of the standard
in future cases, for whenever Justices Brennan, Warren, and
Fortas determine that a given work is not obscene because it
possesses an element of social value, Justices Black and Douglas
may be counted on to provide a majority by concurring in the
result.
As mentioned, Roth provided a test of unpredictable applica-
bility. In the ten years since that decision, the Supreme Court
has produced few results substantially tending to solidify this
area of the law, and these most recent cases do not lessen the
confusion. The principles upon which a majority of the Court
agree are: obscenity is not protected by the first amendment;
the test for obscenity is whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest; if the
material is designed for dissemination to a clearly defined de-
viant group, the prurient-appeal element of the standard is sat-
isfied if the material appeals to the prurient interest of that
27. Justice Clark dissenting in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 442
(1966).
28. In his dissenting opinion, Justice White points out that if the prevailing
opinion is followed, "obscene material, however far beyond customary limits of
candor, is immune if it has any literary style, if it contains any historical refer-
ences or language characteristic of a bygone day, or even if it is printed or bound
in an interesting way." 383 U.S. 413, 461 (1966).
An interesting dilemma would seem to arise when a work exploited by its pub-
lisher for its prurient appeal is found to possess a slight element of social worth.
But the plurality opinion notes that "it does not necessarily follow from this rever-
sal that a determination that MEMoms is obscene in the constitutional serse would
be improper under all circumstances .... Evidence that the book was commer-
cially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other
values, might justify the conclusion that the book was utterly without redeeming
social importance. It is not that in such a setting the social value test is relaxed
so as to dispense with the requirement that a book be utterly devoid of social
value, but rather that . . . where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually
provocative aspects of his publications, a court could accept his evaluation at
its face value." 383 U.S. 413, 420 (1966).
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group; and "in close cases" exploitation of the prurient appeal
of material will be decisive in the determination.
The decisions and views are varied as to other aspects of the
standard and its application. On one hand Justices Brennan,
Fortas, and the Chief Justice are relatively united in the opinion
that the Roth test should be applied to determine the obscenity
of questionable material, and that no material may be declared
obscene if it be found to possess an element of social value; they
stand with the majority in the belief that evidence of exploita-
tion of prurient appeal should be decisive in "close cases. ' 29 On
the other hand Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart fully accept
none of these concepts. Justices Black and Douglas believe
the first amendment does not allow proscription of any mate-
rials not inextricably bound up with illegal activity.3 0 Justice
Stewart feels that the first amendment will permit the proscrip-
tion of "hard-core" pornography only.3 1
Justice Clark denies that the social value criterion consti-
tutes a separate test,32 but agrees that the exploitation factor
should be afforded determinative weight.3 3 Justice Harlan is
of the opinion that the first amendment does not apply to the
federal government and the states with equal vigor, and asserts
that although the federal government may proscribe only hard-
core pornography, the states may adopt any standard of pro-
scription reasonably related to contemporary notions. 34 Justice
White expressly rejects the notion that the social value element
constitutes a separate test, and would apply a limited view of
the Roth standard. 35
Only one clear result emerges as the cumulative effect of
the obscenity decisions, "that no stable approach to the ob-
scenity problem has yet been devised by [the] Court." 36 Justice
29. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Masschusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
30. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (dissenting opinion
of Black, J.) ; id. at 482 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
31. Ginzburg v. United States. 383 U.S. 463, 497 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
32. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 441 (1966) (dissenting opin-
ion).
33. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
34. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (dissenting opin-
ion).
35. Id. at 460 (dissenting opinion).
36. Id. at 455 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
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Black adds, "certainly after the fourteen separate opinions
handed down in these three cases today no person, not even the
most learned judge much less a layman, is capable of knowing
in advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case by
this Court whether certain material comes within the area of
'obscenity' as that term is confused by the Court today. '37 That
this should be so seems particularly incongruous in view of the
marked tendency of the Court to expand the protection of the
first amendment in the area of libel.3 A comparison of the
libel and obscenity cases reveals contradictory tendencies which
considerations of public policy only partially reconcile.
It is submitted that confusion and contradiction reign today
because the Court has never offered a fully acceptable rationale
to support the conclusion that the first amendment permits the
censorship of obscenity, and because it has yet to define obscen-
ity in a consistent and rational manner.
The first point was settled by the majority of the Court in
Roth39 It did not receive the affirmation of a united Court
then, nor does it now. The language of the first amendment
is absolute: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press. ' 40 Two arguments have been
presented as a reason to evade this absolute language. It is
claimed that the existence of anti-obscenity statutes in many
states at the time of the adoption of the amendment indicates
that the drafters intended to except obscenity from its scope.4"
This argument rings false, for at that time the fourteenth
amendment was not yet in effect, and the first amendment was a
restraint on the federal power alone, thus, state statutes are not
relevant to the problem. It is certainly not clear that the publica-
tion of obscenity was a crime at common law; as late as the be-
ginning of the Eighteenth Century the publication of obscenity
was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts,4 2 and the first recorded conviction was in 1727. 43 But
37. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
38. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garri-
son v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
39. Note, however, that even at this early stage the confusion of the majority
was evidenced by marked inconsistencies. Compare the language from Roth in
note 26 supra with the. language quoted from Roth by Justice Clark in the text
accompanying note 27.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
41. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957).
42. The Queen v. Read, 11 Mod. 142 (Q.B. 1707).
43. Dominus Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 789 (K.B. 1727).
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even assuming that the common-law doctrine was settled at the
time, the absolute language of the first amendment does not
warrant the assumption that the doctrine was meant to be in-
corporated intact into the laws of the republic. 44
The second argument would rest on the "clear and present
danger" concept, which is acceptable when applicable only be-
cause it is reasonable to hold that speech which presents a clear
and present danger of illegal action is closely bound to that
action.4 5 Again, those who would challenge the absolute language
of the first amendment must bear the burden of showing that
there exists a significant positive correlation between pornog-
raphy and sex-orientated criminal activity; this burden has never
been met.4" Notwithstanding, it is the settled opinion of the
majority of the Court that obscenity is not within the scope of
the first amendment's protection. This settled, the second point
becomes the crucial one.
The reason the Court has been unable to formulate a defini-
tion of obscenity which admits of equitable application in any
given case is that obscenity is essentially a subjective determina-
tion. 47  It is submitted that the essentials of due process are
violated when publishers and distributors are made to rely on
guesswork in determining whether their activities may give rise
to criminal liability, 8 and that the federal standard for obscenity
should properly be considered void because of its subjective
nature.4 9
44. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 424 (1966) (dissenting
opinion of Douglas, J.) and authorities cited therein.
45. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
46. See Cairnes, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumption of Anti-
Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1034-41(1962); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Con-
stitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 382-87 (1954). For the view that pornographic
literature often deters and provides a substitute for anti-social conduct, see Mur-
phy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 655 (1964).
47. The writer regards a declaration that a given book is obscene as distinctly
analogous to a declaration that a certain woman is beautiful, and submits that
most such declarations more accurately reflect the nature of the perceiver than
that of the perceived.
48. State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 355, 37 So. 2d 815, 817 (1948) : "It is suf-
ficient to say that a criminal statute, in order to be valid and enforceable, must
define the offense so specifically or accurately that any reader having ordinary
intelligence will know when or whether his conduct is on the one side or the
other side of the border line between that which is and that which is not de-
nounced as an offense against the law." For an excellent discussion in this regard
see In re Davis, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966) and authorities cited therein.
49. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 478 (1966) (dissenting
opinion of Black, J6) ; Id. at 497 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
[Vol. XXVII, 108
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A particular problem is that the availability of obscene mate-
rials will have an unhealthy effect on the undisciplined and un-
discriminating minds of young people. But adequate measures
other than universal censorship exist for coping with this threat.
The "clear and present danger" test is more tenable in this lim-
ited area, and would support legislation. The parental duty to
provide for the health and welfare of the child provides added
protection. It is submitted that a less strained interpretation of
the first amendment would lead, not to moral chaos, but to a
heretofore unknown spirit of sexual tolerance in the United
States.
"I would give the broad sweep of the First Amendment full
support. I have the same confidence in the ability of our people
to reject noxious literature as I. have in their capacity to sort
out the true from the false in theology, economics, politics, or
any other field." Gerard A. Rault
INSURANCE -EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSES IN AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY POLICIES
Insured had driven his automobile to a service station to
have it washed and serviced while he was at work. The service
station manager sent an employe, Dronet, to accompany the in-
sured to his place of employment then return the car to the
station. While driving back, Dronet was involved in an inter-
sectional collision with a car driven by plaintiff, who sued
Dronet, the service station owner, and insured's liability carrier
for personal injuries sustained in the collision. The insurance
policy contained a clause excluding coverage with respect "to an
owned automobile while used in the automobile business." The
trial court sustained defendant insurer's motion for summary
judgment denying coverage. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed. Held, the exclusionary clause is susceptible of at least
two meanings and is to be construed against the insurer; thus,
the vehicle being driven with permission of the insured to the
service station by an employe of the station to be washed and
serviced was not being "used in the automobile business" within
the exclusionary clause. Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d
790 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), writs refused, 248 La. 424, 179
So. 2d 18 (1965).
50. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
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